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ABSTRACT 
The introduction of electronic health records lies at the heart of many international 
efforts to improve the safety and quality of healthcare. England has attempted to 
introduce nationally procured electronic health record software, the first country in the 
world to do so. In this qualitative comparative case study tracing local developments 
over time, we sought to generate a detailed picture of the implementation landscape 
characterising this first attempt at implementing nationally procured software through 
studying three purposefully selected hospitals over time. 
 
Despite differences in relation to demographic considerations and local implementation 
strategies, implementing hospitals faced similar technical and political challenges. 
These were coped with differently by the various organisations and individual 
stakeholders due to contextual contingencies. We conclude that national implementation 
efforts need to allow effective technology adoption to occur locally before considering 
larger-scale interoperability. This should involve the allocation of sufficient time for 
individual users and organisations to adjust to the complex changes that often 
accompany such service re-design initiatives.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Internationally, there is increasing interest in the potential of Information Technology 
(IT) to enhance the safety, quality and efficiency of healthcare.
1,2
 The implementation 
of electronic health records (EHRs) is at the heart of many of these initiatives.
3
 
Amongst the many anticipated benefits of EHRs are improved communication between 
different healthcare providers, better availability of information, reduction in medical 
errors, improved organisational functioning, and more streamlined work practices; 
although these are not conclusively underpinned by existing evidence.
3
 
 
Many countries are now investing substantial sums of money as they seek to achieve 
large-scale EHR implementations. Strategies to achieve interoperability between 
different systems and settings vary, but can conceptually be divided into “top-down”, 
“bottom-up” and “middle-out” approaches.4,5 For example, England has embarked on a 
“top-down” implementation of EHRs, characterised by large-scale government-led 
procurement of three commercial systems that individual hospitals have been strongly 
encouraged to implement.
6–10
 In contrast, the USA has adopted a “bottom-up” 
implementation approach, where “meaningful use” goals relating to EHRs have been 
centrally decided by a government agency, but where hospitals have considerable 
choice in how these goals are achieved.
5,11,12
 Australia, has adopted a more “middle-
out” approach including elements of both national guidance and local choice.5,13 
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Many challenges accompanying the introduction of new technology result from the 
necessary changes to and transformations of established organisational processes and 
individual practices.
2,14-18
 There is therefore a real danger that systems that are not 
perceived as being fit-for-purpose are rejected or used in different ways to what was 
originally intended. In line with this, one of the key findings to emerge from the still 
relatively limited number of published accounts is that implementations characterised 
by substantial user involvement in design tend to be more “successful”.19–23 Such 
approaches are however extremely time-consuming, often involving several rounds of 
iterative software development. They are hence difficult to replicate in the context of the 
scaled-up national implementation efforts that are now underway in many parts of the 
world.  
 
A range of additional factors have been identified as playing a potentially important role 
in facilitating EHR implementation and adoption.
3,20,24–74
 Yet these are often viewed in 
isolation, focusing on either technical, social, organisational, or environmental issues. In 
the light of these known and repeatedly encountered problems – even in the context of 
relatively small-scale implementations – it is imperative that lessons from ongoing 
international implementation efforts are learned.  
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As noted above, the English venture involved the national procurement of three EHR 
systems to be implemented by hospitals. One of these was Software X (the focus of this 
paper), the first ever nationally procured EHR system to be built while it was being 
implemented. The reasoning behind this approach was that it could be developed in 
close collaboration with the healthcare professionals who would be using the software. 
Here, we report on a sub-study of a large-scale evaluation of the national 
implementation of EHRs in hospitals.
75,76
 Our results are based on three purposefully 
selected secondary and community hospitals implementing initial functionality of 
Software X. Our aim was to explore early views and experiences of users and 
understand the consequences of the system for work practices as well as general 
organisational functioning. Drawing on these experiences and insights, we sought to 
generate a detailed picture of the implementation landscape characterising this unique 
attempt to implement and adopt a nationally procured software that was co-developed 
by users.   
 
METHODS 
Ethics Statement 
The observational component of this study received ethical approval from the East 
London and the City Research Ethics Committee on the 2
nd
 of April 2009. The 
interview component submitted for ethical review to the same ethics committee but was 
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classed as a service evaluation on the 9
th
 of October 2008 (08/H0703/112). To protect 
the anonymity of participants and hospitals, we have removed potential identifiers 
wherever possible. 
 
Design 
This qualitative study was informed by sociotechnical approaches to studying the 
implementation of IT systems in healthcare.
25,57,68,77
 These highlight the importance of 
investigating not only the consequences of the technology for the organisation, but also 
the consequences of the social setting for technical considerations, and the complex 
inter-relationship between the two.
78–81
 We conceptualised hospitals as case study sites 
and used a multi-sited ethnography approach, which was designed to provide insights 
into the wider social system by including a range of relevant stakeholders from outside 
of the case study sites.
82–86 
As opposed to “traditional ethnography” that is characterised 
by the in-depth exploration of a particular setting, multi-sited ethnography employs 
similar data collection methods (i.e. observations, interviews, and collection of 
associated material), but is characterised by breadth (at the expense of depth that defines 
the traditional ethnographic approach). Drawing on data from different settings can help 
understand the nature of a particular phenomenon of interest from a broader range of 
viewpoints. 
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Sampling 
Sampling of cases/sites and informants was purposeful. Three hospitals were selected as 
being amongst the first in England to implement the nationally procured Software X, 
whilst having different demographics and characteristics (see Table 1). These hospitals 
may be viewed as critical cases as they were all amongst the first to face the 
introduction of Software X.
87,88
 These organisations implemented early limited 
functionality of Software X, including patient management and some clinical software 
modules during the data collection period. This functionality represented one (in Sites B 
and C) and two (in Site A) of four consecutive software releases on the way to having a 
fully integrated EHR (see Table 2). Deployments of these modules were small-scale 
(with Release 1) and large-scale (with Release 2 building on Release 1).  
 
In line with the multi-sited ethnographic approach and informed by sociotechnical 
principles, a wide range of stakeholders within hospitals were sampled over the course 
of the study. This involved initially approaching the Head/Director of IT as the main 
contact locally, and then, through snowball sampling, recruiting further participants 
within the hospitals including healthcare professionals (nurses, doctors, allied health 
professions), implementation team members (e.g. managers, clinical leads), and 
administrative staff. In doing so, the researcher (KC) essentially sampled stakeholders 
related to Software X within the organisations (the case study sites) and beyond, 
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seeking to understand a varied range of different experiences and attitudes. Outwith the 
case study sites and based on the recommendations of existing interviewees, a range of 
additional stakeholders outside the immediate hospital environment were sampled. 
These included developers, governmental stakeholders, representatives from the 
independent sector and the media. For example, if the researcher started at a ward 
speaking to users, who mentioned a particular implementation team member, that 
person’s perspective was actively sought. If this implementation team member 
mentioned another stakeholder such as developers or governmental stakeholders, these 
were approached in turn. 
 
 
Data collection 
Data were collected between February 2009 and November 2010 by KC (an academic 
psychologist), this involving a combination of face-to-face/telephone interviews and 
observational fieldwork. In addition, a variety of relevant documents were collected. 
Throughout the study, a conscious effort was made to feed back emerging findings into 
subsequent data collection activities.  
 
Interviews were semi-structured one-to-one (in some cases one-to-two) discussions, 
which were digitally audio-recorded. Topics explored comprised individual 
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expectations and experiences of using the software, perceived challenges, and 
recommendations for improvement. Detailed topic guides are available from the 
corresponding author upon request. Where possible, interviews in case study sites were 
conducted at two different time points (Table 3).  
 
A mixture of object/activity/person-oriented observation with on-site questioning was, 
where appropriate, employed to complement interviews, for the purposes of 
triangulation and to contribute to a deeper understanding of the sociotechnical processes 
involved in adopting the new technology. The concept of “following the thing”, i.e. 
Software X and related social processes, helped to focus observational data collection 
activities around the software and associated human actions (e.g. direct software use or 
progress meetings). In doing so, the researcher noted setting, actors, activities and 
impressions relating to the observation. The length of formal observations depended 
heavily on the cooperation of gatekeepers, which meant that data collection was 
somewhat opportunistic depending on opportunities arising locally. Observations 
therefore varied in length between individual settings.  
 
Relevant documentary evidence was also collected, these documents being treated as 
“secondary data sources” (i.e. as produced for purposes other than the research study). 
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They were used to give an insight into organisational plans and to gain an overview of 
activities in order to contextualise the interviews and observations.
89,90
 
 
The researcher also kept a research journal outlining personal ideas and conceptions in 
order to make the research process as transparent and reflexive as possible. Data 
collection continued until theoretical saturation (the point at which no new themes 
emerged) was reached, although we acknowledge that this saturation related to the early 
implementation/adoption period only. 
 
Data analysis 
Interviews were transcribed verbatim and together with the transcribed observation 
notes and documents uploaded into NVivo8 software. Thematic qualitative analysis was 
informed by the approach outlined by Miles and Huberman,
91
 and also drew on the 
analytic approaches discussed by Mason including cross-sectional and non cross-
sectional indexing (i.e. examining common as well as specific themes), and the use of 
diagrams.
89
 
 
The first step thus involved developing an overall coding framework based on 
categories and sub-categories identified in the literature as being central to IT 
implementation and adoption in healthcare.
3,20,24–74
 This entailed creating broad 
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definitions of each category, with particular attention being paid to not defining these 
either too loosely or tightly.
89
 Careful attention was also paid to allowing additional 
themes and sub-themes to emerge. This constituted the inductive part of analysis and 
involved examining different data through different lenses (e.g. from different 
stakeholder viewpoints, looking for potential alternative explanations), focusing on 
exploring the uniqueness of parts of data, and investigating processes that were too 
complex to be captured by the developed coding framework.
89
 In exploring different 
viewpoints, for example, analysis focused on examining how participants interpreted 
the situation (as recorded in the transcripts) and how these different viewpoints were 
integrated to produce effects. The approach to analysis therefore consisted of a mixture 
of deductive and inductive approaches.
89
 This helped to focus data collection, whilst 
being open to emerging issues. The process was further supported by constant revisions 
to the coding framework in the light of emerging themes from the data.  
 
Coding the data was essentially a process of organising, by indexing relevant 
transcripts, notes and documents against both pre-established and emerging categories. 
In doing so, the categories were indexed along the following dimensions identified as 
important in the literature when considering EHR implementations: history and context, 
technical dimension, human and social dimension, organisational dimension, and wider 
environmental dimension.
3,20,24–74
 In line with the sociotechnical approach, coded data 
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that was found to belong to two or more of these dimensions (illustrating the dynamic 
interplay between social and technical factors) was examined in most detail. Emerging 
issues were then re-ordered to form the core of the analysis, focusing on exploring 
similarities and differences between hospitals, data sources, interviewees and time-
points. This was achieved by entering these in a tabular format, recording (where 
relevant) key issues at the two different time points, perceived causes for changes over 
time, tensions and underlying issues (ways in which effects may have been produced, 
and exploration of links between emerging themes). Cross–case analysis and integration 
with the wider contextual interviews involved exploring similarities and differences 
between case study sites as well as likely underlying factors contributing to these. The 
resulting main themes outlined below were chosen on the basis of representing the main 
factors influencing developments and implementation progress locally and nationally. 
 
RESULTS 
Interview data were obtained from a total of 66 different participants within case study 
sites and 14 additional participants from outside these case study sites. Implementation 
team members interviewed consisted of a mixture of clinical IT leads, IT managers 
(both internal and sub-contracted) and training professionals. Users included a mixture 
of ward managers, consultants, nurses, ward clerks, administrative staff, pharmacists, 
allied health professionals and junior doctors. A total of 41 interviews (with 27 different 
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participants) were conducted in Site A (an acute hospital), 26 interviews (with 19 
different participants) in Site B (a community hospital), and 21 interviews (with 20 
different participants) in Site C (a mental health hospital). An active effort was made to 
obtain both positive and negative perspectives.  A summary of data collected is given in 
Table 4. 
 
Four main themes emerged from our analysis: 
 Political and economic considerations: different hospitals, but similar problems  
 Starting points and different developments over time – the role of scale and 
progress in organisational coping 
 The consequences of software characteristics 
 Individual coping: intended and unintended workarounds1 and their 
consequences.  
 
We discuss below our findings in more detail, illustrated by selected quotes based on 
frequency (i.e. how often they occurred), similarities/differences (i.e. clustering of 
themes that had common or uncommon characteristics), and significance (i.e. to what 
extent they were judged to affect other emerging issues and examining potential 
underlying factors). Detailed themes and sub-themes are summarised in Box 1.  
                                                 
1
 We defined workarounds as behavior employed by users to overcome a perceived limitation in a 
technical system. 
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A number of other factors were also identified as being important in influencing 
implementation and adoption activities (e.g. the role of champions, training, leadership), 
but as these are relatively well-known,
3,20,25–74
 we have focused here on reporting the 
more novel findings that related to the unique national implementation set-up. In 
selecting the themes reported, the main aim has been to create a detailed picture of the 
national implementation landscape, portraying how the range of factors identified inter-
related with each other. 
 
Political and economic considerations: different hospitals, but similar problems  
Despite the demographic and strategic differences between hospitals (Tables 1 and 2), 
the wider political and economic environment in which implementations were taking 
place resulted in similar challenges experienced locally. There have been continuous 
changes relating to the overall political and economic landscape, including a general 
election and the formation of a new coalition government, which had a mandate for 
substantial wide-ranging budget cuts in the face of the recession/national debt.
92,93
 
These developments resulted in concerns about the lack of resources to resolve 
problems that arose in the context of implementing Software X, limited resources to 
share experiences/lessons learned between hospitals and concerns over resources and 
support for future releases.
92,93
 As a consequence, participants repeatedly questioned the 
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adequacy of the national implementation strategy and highlighted the need to balance 
local needs of users and the organisation with national requirements for standardisation.  
 
“Yes cause otherwise it might be something which is so specific that it, other people 
wouldn’t, couldn’t work with it, I can’t think of an example off hand but everybody has 
their own slight ways of working so you have to make sure that the core, the basic 
function is acceptable to everybody and then the more peripheral things you can 
customise here in the organisation.” (Interview, Healthcare Professional) 
 
In addition, contractual arrangements appeared to have contributed to perceived 
powerlessness for stakeholders on the ground. Hospitals lacked the ability to customise 
software according to their individual needs and influence deployment timelines in line 
with organisational readiness.  
 
“…the bottom line is that input has been defined within a national contract, it doesn’t 
matter how much I complain about it, it doesn’t matter how upset and annoyed [name 
of the Local Service Provider] may be about it, the fact is it’s subject to a wider 
contract and I think until that, until some of those issues are addressed…how did we 
arrive at the situation where the supplier is the one that’s responsible for the plan and 
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the contract…we were told by the SHA [Strategic Health Authority2] well you’re not 
going to get anything else because you’re not the customer.”  (Interview, IT Manager) 
 
Moreover, hospitals were under significant political and hence media pressure to show 
progress with implementation, as there were increasingly negative public perceptions of 
the national implementation strategy. The media was said to contribute to this by 
focusing on delays, spiralling costs and various technical and other problems occurring 
during implementations. Political impatience may thus have inadvertently contributed to 
problems experienced locally (as was, for example, the case in Site A) by prematurely 
progressing with implementations. 
 
“…when you talk to people from other, particularly the Early Adopters3, the pressure 
they were under to sign off was horrendous, you know, they were saying if you don’t 
sign this off the Secretary of State for Health is going to have to stand up in Parliament 
and explain why so just sign it, you know, that kind of pressure is horrendous.” 
(Interview, Manager) 
 
Many of these national developments were the result of attempts to address problems 
encountered on the ground. For example, as stakeholders increasingly questioned the 
                                                 
2
 SHAs are governance structures in the English NHS that implement policies at the local level 
3
 Organizations that were amongst the first to implement Software X as part of the national strategy 
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“top-down” implementation model and associated contractual arrangements as well as 
political pressure, it has over time slowly changed to a more localised approach.
75 
At the 
time of writing, the coalition government announced an increased focus on systems 
choice for local organisations and an opening of the software provider market to a larger 
number of accredited commercial suppliers.
92,93
 In line with these developments, central 
leadership of the implementation of EHRs in hospitals has over time somewhat lost 
momentum as the designated central implementation authority (NHS Connecting for 
Health) was integrated within the Department of Health’s Informatics Directorate. 
 
Starting points and different developments over time – the role of scale and 
progress in organisational coping 
The way hospitals dealt with the challenges arising from this complex environment 
(defined as “organisational coping”) differed. This was particularly apparent when 
examining developments over time. Despite fundamental demographic differences, the 
three hospitals implemented (at least to begin with) the same software, all gradually 
replacing paper systems, but with somewhat different functionalities tailored to their 
particular setting. For example, Site A as an acute hospital implemented functionality 
that allowed them to request pathology and radiology results electronically, whilst Sites 
B and C (the mental health and community settings) began by implementing clinical 
documentation functionality allowing structured documentation of care procedures, 
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treatments and future plans. This perhaps reflected the different communication needs 
across settings, with secondary care prioritising the improvement of communication 
with geographically disconnected departments, and community/mental health settings 
prioritising the improvement of communication within their teams. Initially, Site A and 
B followed a small scale implementation approach, going live with one ward and nine 
users respectively, whilst Site C implemented on a larger scale, going live with 150 
users. As time progressed, it became apparent that Site C, despite the initial “head 
start”, remained relatively static over a sustained period of time without visible progress 
either in terms of a larger scale roll-out or significantly improved software functionality. 
Site A, on the other hand, due to political and media pressure to progress, implemented 
increasing software functionality. However, this led to significant problems in the 
hospital, mainly due to a lack of organisational ability to plan for software that had 
never been implemented in this setting and the large user base. In contrast, Site B 
deployment remained small-scale with no further functionality being deployed over a 
relatively long period of time. Here, all efforts concentrated on making the software 
work, this being achieved through intensive development activity in close collaboration 
with users. However, this took time, so much so that the overall strategic direction was 
reconsidered in light of resources spent, with hospital management seriously 
considering switching to an alternative system outside of the Government Programme.  
 
 19 
“I was sitting in a room next door to the meeting and chatted to healthcare 
professionals one by one, this time it was a mixture of those who had been using 
Software X since the beginning and those who just started using it (the other half of the 
team), the whole service is now on Software X and it seems to be going very well. The 
problem is that [name of IT Manager]  has left quite quickly as his contract has not 
been extended, everyone feels that the hospital does not want Software X to succeed as 
the hospital wants to go with [name of Software Y] instead, it is felt that this is why the 
most important support person was removed from the team, the new healthcare 
professionals are getting on quite well which is felt to be due to the fact that the system 
is now much more developed and due to the hard work of the early user healthcare 
professionals, everyone is disappointed and does not know what will happen, they feel 
that pulling the plug on Software X now would be a major waste of money” (Researcher 
field notes) 
 
As a result of the perceived lack of progress in system development over time, users in 
Site A were increasingly frustrated; at Sites B and C, management became increasingly 
frustrated with the lack of progress in relation to the scale of the implementation (i.e. the 
limited overall number of active users). There seemed to be two different notions of 
progress across cases, both of which need to be fulfilled for an implementation to be 
considered by the majority of stakeholders as relatively “successful” (acknowledging 
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that the notion of “success” itself depends on the viewpoint of the observer). User 
satisfaction appeared to be closely linked to perceived system development progress, 
whilst political and managerial stakeholders tended to focus on scale (including both 
functionality and user base). Site A illustrated that progress in relation to system 
development had not been achieved, whilst developments in Site B indicated that 
progress in relation to scale had not been achieved. Site C could be placed somewhere 
in the middle with an initially promising implementation in relation to scale, but lacking 
progress in relation to software development over time.  
 
The consequences of software characteristics 
As a result of the national procurement, all hospitals had to deal with a similar 
technology. The biggest challenge in this respect was that this technology was still in 
development, which affected planning of work and business processes, training as well 
as user engagement. It also resulted in a range of unanticipated problems for both 
organisational functioning and individual contexts of use. 
 
“I mean a lot of the R1 [referring to early and limited functionality including patient 
demographics] functionality works quite well but on the other hand the clinical content 
is woefully inadequate, you know, I mean they’re working hard to try and develop 
clinical content but it, you know, without clinical content clinicians won’t use it… I 
 21 
mean we were really, you know, you can only sort of entice people for so long until they 
finally sort of get fed up and say well, you know, come back and talk to me when you’ve 
got something to work with and that’s a lot of what we’re having now.” (Interview, 
Manager) 
 
The immaturity of the system also meant that all hospitals faced similar usability issues. 
These included, amongst others, freezing of screens, a long time to load documents, a 
perceived lack of intuitiveness, long log-in times, perceived inappropriate layouts of 
forms and print-outs, and the perceived inconsistency of language. Over time, some of 
these issues were addressed, but users in Sites A and C felt they were not addressed 
sufficiently for the system to be considered useable. Users in Site B, on the other hand, 
felt that over time system performance had improved considerably, possibly due to the 
intensive support by a dedicated IT Manager and the close involvement of users in 
development. As a result, users in Sites A and C tended to be relatively negative 
towards the system, whilst users in Site B became more positive over time. 
 
Users further complained about the large number of clicks and mandatory screens in the 
system, which was felt to increase workload; this was a problem encountered in all three 
case study sites and persisted over time, irrespective of the setting and in stark contrast 
to the anticipated benefits of EHRs.
3
 It did not appear that the slowing of workflows 
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was expected or planned for adequately, or that the persistence of these problems was 
anticipated. At Site B, it was addressed by allowing users an extra five minutes per 
appointment when they were using Software X. However, the other two sites did not 
address this issue, which may have exacerbated negative user attitudes. 
 
“…with some patients if it was a heavy case it could take them 20 minutes to load a 
form and, you know, so it’s just not workable.” (Interview, Manager) 
 
Developments at Site A were somewhat different. Despite similar usability issues, the 
deployment did not initially appear significantly to affect organisational functioning. 
However, when the hospital implemented extended software functionality replacing the 
local Patient Administration System (PAS), stability issues caused a fundamental 
disruption. As a result, all efforts there focused on resolving issues with system stability 
as opposed to usability issues.  
 
“Yes and until we get [Release 2], the PAS base stabilised, we can’t roll out the other 
stuff and we’re desperate to do that because that’s the point at which Software X starts 
to add value, at the moment, benefit? None!” (Interview, Manager) 
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Only when organisational functioning was compromised were usability issues revisited 
and the fitness for purpose of the software was increasingly questioned by management 
(Site A). In Site B, on the other hand, usability issues were the focus of efforts. Only 
when these were addressed and users were relatively happy with the software was 
further roll-out considered. It therefore seems important to build successful 
developments on a solid base of usable software before considering further roll-out, but 
this was challenging in the context of the considerable political pressure to increase the 
scale of the implementation. 
 
Individual coping: intended and unintended workarounds and their consequences 
Whilst we used the notion of organisational coping to refer to the way hospitals dealt 
with the challenges arising from the complex “top-down” implementation environment, 
we use the notion of individual coping to refer to the way users dealt with the 
introduction of the new technology. Users had to employ temporary workarounds that 
were accepted by the organisation due to the initial running of paper-based systems. 
This was perceived by users as unnecessary duplication of activity, but accepted by 
most as it was expected to attenuate in due course. Site B illustrated that this did indeed 
happen when the system was rolled out, which meant a reduction of printing activity. 
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“There are some annoying delays between having completed the form and printing it, 
there are some unnecessary pages in between”, he had to click several boxes e.g. “print 
local” and “print preview” before being able to hit the actual print button, ticking these 
boxes is compulsory. (Researcher notes, Observation) 
 
In addition, all users had to change existing work practices to fit in with the demands of 
the technology, resulting in workarounds that were unintended by management. Across 
sites the most common techniques to achieve this included using other systems to 
compensate for perceived shortcomings (e.g. Microsoft Word or paper), partial use, and 
“tricking the system” (e.g. if users could not move to the next item without completing a 
free text box, some would simply copy text from other boxes). Most of these 
workarounds were what has been classified as “essential hindrance workarounds”.42 
These were used to get around perceived problems in the system that were seen as 
making use very time-consuming and by some participants perceived to shorten the 
time they could spend with patients. These were seen as essential as they were designed 
to save time on administrative tasks, thereby freeing up time for provision of more 
direct patient care. 
 
However, there were also some more fundamental changes in work practices imposed 
by the system, which appeared to be of greater concern to users as they were not 
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expected to attenuate over time and could often not be addressed by “working around 
them”. These varied across sites, but often represented changes in perceived 
professional identities resulting from the way the system re-structured care activities. 
For example, many clinical users reported an increase in administrative tasks, which 
they felt was not what they “signed up for” as it meant they spent less time on clinical 
activities.  
 
“We’ll put this data in and put that in, well I’m sorry that’s not my job, you know, and 
putting demographics in isn’t a nursing task it’s a secretarial one, you know, putting 
ethnicity in it’s not my job it’s, you know, so that was the ethos of it.” (Interview, 
Healthcare Professional) 
 
Therefore, most users carefully ‘guarded’ the interactions with patients, by keeping 
them as personal as possible. This was particularly apparent in settings where computers 
were originally planned to be used in the clinical encounter (Site A during ward rounds 
and Site B during one-to-one consultations), which was not perceived as appropriate as 
users felt it affected the therapeutic relationship (Site B). In other sites, it was not 
viewed as fast and flexible enough to be used in the fast-moving clinical setting (Site 
A). As a result, clinical and administrative tasks tended to be separated at all hospitals 
and handheld computers were used to a minimum. As a knock-on effect, data entry into 
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electronic systems was often delayed, which meant that the system was not as up-to-
date as it was initially planned to be. This lack of contemporaneous data entry has 
obvious implications for the quality and safety of care (e.g. if a certain procedure or 
medication administration is not documented and therefore repeated), as well as 
potentially associated medico-legal consequences. This issue is likely to pose significant 
challenges in future deployments as clinical users are likely to resist use of computers if 
it is perceived to go against the basic philosophical underpinnings of their profession.  
 
“The length of time it takes to actually get that note in there is just such hard work and 
you end up lumping things together because you think I’m not going to open it up again 
and put a second phone call in, you know, I’ll do it a day later when I’ve done three 
calls that day and just throw them all in together. I end up keeping a paper note to 
prompt me because I haven’t got time.  I tend to do it all in one big chunk, so I end up 
doing a paper note saying, you know, don’t forget to write these up.  You go in and 
think right rather than do separate Software X’s for these two phone calls I’ll throw 
them all in one which works better.” (Interview, Healthcare Professional) 
 
Similarly, users felt that the balance between security measures and the complex day-to-
day service demands characterising the healthcare environment was not fit-for purpose 
and access cards needed to log into the system were often shared or left in terminals. 
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Again, this is likely to be of continuing importance resulting in compromised security 
measures. 
 
DISCUSSION 
Overall, the national implementation of Software X has been much slower and on a 
much more limited scale than originally anticipated. Our findings begin to shed light on 
potential reasons for this lack of progress, as they suggest how the experiences at early 
implementer sites may have affected the rate of national implementation progress over 
time, illustrated by, for example, an increasing focus on local involvement in decision 
making.
92-95
 
 
As can be seen, the national “top down” arrangements have had significant 
consequences for the way Software X was procured, implemented and used locally. 
Despite the obvious differences between organisations, they were therefore often faced 
with similar technical and political challenges. These were coped with differently by 
different organisations due to contextual contingencies (e.g. implementation scale) and 
coping of users reflecting a range of organisational and individual differences. The 
mutually shaping relationship between these two types of coping has been highlighted, 
outlining consequences of both organisational coping on individual users and vice 
versa.  
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However, many on-going deliberations and political debates relating to large-scale IT 
implementations assume that local factors are relatively stable, neglecting this mutually 
shaping relationship between national and local developments.
57,59,96,97
 It is therefore 
important that this dynamic environment is reflected in strategic planning of such 
initiatives, “top-down” or otherwise as national ventures need, by definition, some 
degree of national guidance. 
 
Any national implementation effort should therefore focus (at least initially) primarily 
on making systems work locally. Focusing principally on interoperability, as in the 
English approach by procuring national software with limited customisability, illustrates 
a lack of appreciation of local factors and in particular the dynamic interplay between 
the local and the national contexts. As our findings indicate, this local adjustment takes 
time, particularly when implementing software that is perceived by users as lacking 
fitness-for-purpose. Associated with this is the need for visible short-term and long-term 
benefits to users, organisations and patients. The latter two may take significantly 
longer to realise and had indeed not materialised in any of the three hospitals studied. 
Our work has shown that there is clearly a need for sufficient time and resources to 
allow users and organisations to cope with change and deal with emerging challenges 
and consequences resulting from the introduction of the new technology. Furthermore, 
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this need for time and space should be accompanied by adequate training and support 
structures involving ongoing and two-way communication between implementers and 
users.
3,20,24–74
 These conditions were eventually fulfilled in Site B, which, from our 
point of view, could be described as a relative local “success” in terms of software 
usability which led to high adoption rates and some early benefits for users.  
 
In line with this argument, a “successful” national implementation is possibly more 
likely to be realised if it is built on the basis of several “successful” local 
implementations (i.e. procuring software that satisfies user, organisational and patient 
needs). Otherwise, there is a real danger that systems are simply not used or used in 
ways other than intended, which will in turn threaten national implementation 
“success”. In addition, the more practical factors of systems interoperability (most likely 
to be achieved through some kind of consistent approach to set standards) and scale of 
adoption seem to be important here.
4,11,12,98,99
 
 
The strengths of our work include its real-time, longitudinal nature as well as the range 
of data obtained from different sources. However, naturally there are also limitations. 
Firstly, it is important to recognise that the case study sites may not be representative of 
the wider range of hospitals in England (or indeed internationally) that are yet to 
implement EHRs. Nevertheless, the fact that selection of our cases was theoretically 
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informed allowed us to make theoretical generalisations to other settings,
100
 and the in-
depth nature of our work has allowed us to identify a number of common factors that 
are likely to be transferable. Secondly, our work may not necessarily have provided 
insights into all aspects of implementation and adoption activities, and was influenced 
by our assumptions and data sources. We did not enter the field without preconceptions, 
for example in relation to the “top-down” imposing nature of the Programme, which 
combined with our close involvement with those that had to cope with the consequences 
of the national implementation locally, most likely influenced our data collection and 
analysis activities. We have attempted to address this by outlining our methods in as 
much detail as possible. Similarly, our results only represent a part of our overall 
findings, identified on the basis of our aims, namely the early experiences of 
organisations and users attempting to implement a nationally procured system.  
 
CONCLUSIONS 
This comparative case study has provided insights into the mutually shaping 
relationship between national and local factors within the context of a national EHR 
implementation. Hospitals studied were in many ways faced with similar issues 
surrounding national arrangements and resulting technological properties. However, 
different localities dealt with these in different ways relating to organisational coping 
(e.g. scale), and similarly in other ways often relating to individual coping (e.g. 
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workarounds). These, in turn, affected wider environmental developments. Drawing on 
our results, we have developed a more detailed appreciation of sociotechnical factors in 
national implementation approaches than can be found in the current literature. 
 
Several lessons from these findings can be applied to international efforts of large-scale 
EHR implementation. We have summarised these in Box 2. By contrasting different 
experiences over time from a variety of perspectives, we have argued that progress in 
software development (including resolving issues with system usability) needs to be 
realised first before tackling progress in terms of deployment scale. Otherwise there is a 
danger that local issues compromise national implementation progress. This will only 
be achieved in close collaboration with users and with a system that is perceived as fit-
for purpose, bringing observable benefits to individuals, organisations and patients. 
National implementation approaches therefore need to be cognizant of local 
developments, before considering issues surrounding systems interoperability, scale and 
secondary uses of data.  
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Table 1: Characteristics of recruited hospitals 
Site Type of 
hospital 
Teaching 
status 
Foundation 
status 
(indicating 
the level of 
autonomy) 
Location Number 
of beds 
Approximate 
annual 
turnover 
A Acute Non-
teaching 
Foundation 
(i.e. more 
autonomous) 
Rural 1,021 beds £231m 
B Community Non-
teaching 
Non-
Foundation 
(i.e. less 
autonomous) 
Urban N/A £152m 
C Mental 
Health 
Non-
teaching 
Foundation 
(i.e. more 
autonomous) 
Rural Mostly 
outpatients 
but 359 
inpatient 
beds 
£97m 
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Table 2: Software X functionality implemented in case study sites 
 Functionality implemented 
Site A Release 1: Requests and Results functionality including radiology, 
endoscopy, pathology; and limited clinical documentation; 
implemented across two wards 
Release 2: Patient Administration System replacement; 
implemented across the hospital 
Site B Release 1: clinical documentation functionality supporting 
recording and maintaining medical histories, clinical notes, care 
events, demographic details, and task management; implemented in 
one specialist service 
Site C Release 1: clinical documentation functionality including risk 
indicator assessment forms, progress notes, request forms, 
electronic discharge summaries, order communications for 
pathology; implemented in one specialist service 
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Table 3: The two data collection points in case study sites 
 Time 1 data collection Time 2 data collection 
Site A February 2009 - October 
2009: shortly after the Trust 
went live with Release 1 on 
one ward 
September 2010 – 
November 2010: when the 
Trust had implemented 
Release 2 functionality  
Site B July 2009 – February 2010: 
approximately a year after 
the Trust went live with 
Release 1 with half of one 
service 
June 2010 – July 2010: 
shortly after the Trust had 
rolled out the functionality 
to the whole service 
Site C December 2009 – February 
2010: approximately three 
months after the Trust went 
live with Release 1 
August 2010 – November 
2010: approximately six 
months later, the time after 
which a certain embedding 
of the software was 
assumed to have taken 
place 
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Table 4: Overview of data collected in case study sites 
 Data collected at 
Site A  
Data collected at 
Site B  
Data collected at 
Site C 
Time period of 
data collection 
February 2009 - 
November 2010 
July 2009 - July 
2010 
December 2009 -
November 2010 
Interviews 41 interviews with 
hospital staff with a 
total of 27 different 
interviewees: 6 
operational staff 
and 21 users 
26 interviews with 
hospital staff with a 
total of 19 different 
interviewees: 5 
operational staff 
and 14 users 
21 interviews with 
hospital staff with a 
total of 20 different 
interviewees: 6 
operational staff 
and 14 users 
Observations 
(noted down in 
associated field 
notes) 
10 hours (including 
an inpatient surgery 
setting and an 
outpatient setting 
where the software 
was used) 
24 hours (including 
use of the software 
healthcare settings 
and staff meetings) 
4.5 hours of staff 
using the software 
Notes from 
recruitment 
meeting 
Yes Yes Yes 
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Press statements eHealth Insider 
(identified via a 
search for “[name 
of Site]”), 
conducted on the 
25th June 2009 and 
repeated on 4th 
November 2010 – 
77 pages altogether. 
eHealth Insider and 
Computer Weekly 
(identified via a 
search for “[name 
of Site]”), 
conducted in 
January 2010 and 
repeated in October 
2010 – 60 pages 
altogether 
eHealth Insider and 
Computer Weekly 
(identified via a 
search for “[name 
of Site]”), 
conducted on 22nd 
February 2010 and 
repeated on 4th 
November 2010 – 
12 pages altogether 
Hospital 
documents 
Deployment 
History Timeline, 
Project Initiation 
Document (PID), 
Electronic Patient 
Record Next Stage 
Business Case. 
Project Initiation 
Document (PID), 
two Project Status 
Reports, several 
sets of minutes 
from Software X 
Steering Group and 
associated 
meetings, Interim 
Evaluation Report. 
Project Initiation 
Document (PID), 
two Deployment 
Verification 
Reports, Lessons 
Learnt Report 
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Researcher field 
journal 
12 pages 5 pages 14 pages 
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Box 1: Themes and sub-themes emerging from the analysis 
Political and economic considerations 
- Changing political and economic landscape  
- Need to balance local needs with national requirements 
- Contractual arrangements and perceived powerlessness 
- Public and political pressure to show progress  
 
Starting points and different developments over time in case study sites 
- Different implementation strategies and scale 
- Different strategies to cope with national pressures 
- Progress in relation to scale versus progress in relation to software development 
 
The consequences of software characteristics 
- Immaturity of the technology and consequences for planning, engagement, as well as 
usability 
 
Individual coping: intended and unintended workarounds and their consequences 
- Workarounds employed by users desired by implementers (i.e. those that were 
logistically unavoidable due to the initially limited functionality available) 
 56 
- Workarounds employed by users not desired by implementers (i.e. those that were 
theoretically avoidable but were employed by users to cope with increases in 
workloads)   
- Fundamental changes in perceived professional identities 
- Preserving interactions with patients 
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Box 2: Summary of implications for policy and lessons learnt 
- User involvement in all stages of the implementation is key. This should encompass 
ongoing and two-way communication between implementers and users. 
- There is a need to build on a solid base of usable software before considering further 
roll-out. 
- There is a need to recognise that the implementation of EHRs is a long-term process, 
and not a short-term project. 
- Sufficient time and resources need to allow users and organisations to cope with 
change and deal with emerging challenges and consequences resulting from the 
technology introduction. 
- There is a need to make the software work optimally locally before attempting to roll it 
out on a larger scale. 
- Customisation is important to allow commercial systems to suit local needs. 
- There is a need for an increased focus on social and cultural factors which need to be 
taken into account when designing systems. IT should be viewed as an enabler to 
improve business processes. 
- Managerial large-scale benefits and clinical small-scale benefits need to be carefully 
balanced as there are likely to be trade-offs with a too narrow focus on either. 
 
 
 
